Cabinet reshuffles occur when the head of government rotates or changes the members of their cabinet. They are more common in parliamentary systems where ministers are drawn from the legislature than in presidential systems where they require confirmation by a separate legislative body. Cabinet reshuffles are also more frequent in autocratic systems where the head of state can act without the checks and balances offered by a legislature or public scrutiny.
Ministerial churn can harm policy implementation. Excessive turnover makes it harder for ministers to build expertise about their department, and it can erode public confidence in the government. It can also empower political rivals by sending them to the backbenches, releasing them from collective cabinet responsibility and allowing them to openly criticise the prime minister’s administration.
A reshuffle can reveal weakness: if the head of state is unwilling or unable to move key ministers, it can reveal an imbalance between the executive and parliament that needs addressing. For example, Gordon Brown’s attempts to move Alistair Darling from the Treasury or Theresa May’s attempt to move Jeremy Hunt from the Home Office both failed to take place, because the ministers refused to accept demotion and threatened to resign.
Although reshuffles are a feature of most democracies, they have rarely been the subject of systematic comparative study. This collection brings together novel research on the causes and effects of cabinet reshuffles in a wide range of political systems. It is underpinned by a mix of theoretical approaches, from resource-oriented to rational choice institutionalism, and draws on work in a wide range of disciplines including political science, public administration, law, history, sociology, and management.